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W

As the economy worsens and traditional sources of revenue
dry up, businesses everywhere are scrounging for
ways to stay afloat. Higher education isn’t immune from these fiscal pressures. At most universities, tuition continues to rise geometrically,1 and presidents face increased pressure
to keep costs down and increase efficiency. Many universities are
using higher ratios of adjunct faculty to tenured and tenure-track
†

1

E ARE LIVING IN INTERESTING TIMES.

Nancy Rapoport is the Gordon Silver Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Copyright © Nancy B. Rapoport 2009. All rights
reserved. Professor Rapoport has just published, with co-editors Jeffrey D. Van Niel and
Bala G. Dharan, ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL
READER, 2D (Foundation Press 2009).
See The $50K Club: 58 Private Colleges Pass a Pricing Milestone, CHRON. HIGHER ED.,
Nov. 1, 2009, available at chronicle.com/article/The-50K-Club-58-Private/
48989/ (58 private colleges are charging $50,000 for tuition, room, and board
this year, up from five such colleges the year before); cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Geometric_progression.
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faculty than ever before, and various constituencies are clamoring
for better measures of student outcomes to capture whether an
educational institution is, in fact, educating its students.2
Into these interesting times returns the traditional debate about
whether tenure continues to make sense.3 In the “real world,” people are losing their jobs left and right – so why should professors
have a lifetime guarantee of job security? Linked to tenure, of
course, is the concept of academic freedom. According to the
American Association of University Professors’ classic 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,4
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common
good and not to further the interest of either the individual
teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies
to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its
teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights
of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in
learning. It carries with it duties correlative with rights.
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom
of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession
attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success
of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to
society.5
2

3

4

5

See, e.g., Commission appointed by Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, A
Test of Leadership[:] Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education, available at www.
ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/final-report.pdf; cf. AAUP
Statement on Spellings Commission Report, available at www.aaup.org/AAUP/GR/
federal/FutureofHigherEd/spellrep.htm.
See, e.g., Roger Bowen, A Faustian Bargain for Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER
ED., Oct. 3, 2008, available at chronicle.com/article/A-Faustian-Bargain-forAcad/8041/.
Available at www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm [hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles].
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Freedom and Responsibility
Finkin and Post’s book, For the Common Good, provides a valuable
exposition of the development of academic freedom in the United
States. Tracing the history of academic freedom from its roots in
German higher education to the modern-day version,6 the authors
note a key distinction between the governance of German universities – governed by the faculty itself – and the early American universities, which were governed more like other businesses, with a
president chosen by a board composed of non-professors.7
That difference in governance was more than mere windowdressing. For universities governed by non-professors, the governing board could consider the entire faculty to be employees, not
management; therefore, the decisions about what those employees
could research and teach would be left to the president, not to the
faculty-employees themselves. Such an allocation of duties would,
of course, be anathema to the modern American university faculty.
As academic freedom developed in the United States, then,
American professors sought a version of academic freedom
that reflected the influence of “a stronger social and constitutional commitment to the idea of freedom of speech,” as
well as a more pragmatic commitment to the social utility
of professional scholarship. But these differences [from the
German model], critical as they are, should not obscure the
essential fact that the American vision of academic freedom, like the German akademische Freiheit, derives almost
entirely from an understanding of the vocation of scholarship.8

We don’t talk much about the vocation of scholarship – that
driving force that causes professors to research and to disseminate
their research. For that matter, we don’t talk about what drives
people to work in academia, rather than in the private sector. Private-sector researchers perform many of the same functions that
6

7
8

MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 23 (Yale University Press 2009) [hereinafter
COMMON GOOD].
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
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professors do (and often get paid much more, to boot). But the difference between private-sector researchers and academic researchers is that the latter have the ability to set their own research agendas, separate and apart from the interests of the entity issuing their
paychecks. It is that separation of salary from research agenda that
sets academics apart from private-sector researchers and, in turn,
creates a strange breed of “employee.”
Faculty members are not “employees” of the university in the
same sense that other university workers are “employees” (or that
private-sector researchers are “employees”). Faculty members look
like employees, to be sure: they get paid by the university; they
have certain responsibilities in terms of teaching, research, and
service; they have workspace allocated to them by the university.9
But Finkin and Post argue that faculty members have duties that
extend beyond a particular university to the larger obligation of
academics generally.10 As they explain,
The core principle of American academic freedom may be
found in this remarkable passage [from the 1915 Declaration
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure]. It argues that faculty are not “employees” answerable to the will
of their employers but instead “appointees” responsible “to
9

To those who argue that faculty members are employees because of the similarities they have to other university employees, and who tend to use the hoary old
saw, “if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and swims like a duck, it’s a
duck,” I have to respond: if someone dresses like a surgeon and carries a scalpel,
that doesn’t reassure me that the person is necessarily a surgeon. Before that
person sliced into me, I’d want a little more proof. Cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Duck_test (describing the origins of the “duck test”).
10
My dad was a private-sector research scientist for his entire career, and he’s
happy to note that he, too, believed that he had a duty to conduct research that
was honest and capable of being replicated. To the extent that Finkin and Post are
trying to separate private-sector researchers from academic ones on the grounds
that the latter have some special duty to their profession, they might be painting
too broad a picture. All researchers have a responsibility to their profession. I
think that the distinction really is between for-profit research and not-for-profit
research (even though some academics can make quite a good living with the
results of their research).
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the wider public” for the fulfillment of the social function of
universities. The 1915 Declaration justifies the transformation of faculty from employees to appointees on the basis of
two key conceptual premises. The first concerns the purpose of the university as an institution; the second concerns
the professional expertise of faculty. . . .
Because faculty are professional experts trained in the
mastery of these disciplinary practices [that enable the acquisition of knowledge], they are “appointed” to discharge
the essential university function of producing knowledge.
In this task they are answerable to the public at large rather
than to the particular desires of employers.11

It’s not the nature of research itself, then, that makes academics
more than mere employees. It’s the nature of universities, where
the academics work, that give academics that “employee-plus” characteristic. If professors are not actually “appointees” for a greater
good, then at least they’re something more than mere cogs in a research-producing machine.12 Finkin and Post link academic freedom
to the raison d’être of the academy itself.
One of the most useful parts of the book debunks the traditional
argument that academic freedom in the U.S. is unnecessary because
of the overarching protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee
of freedom of speech. Finkin and Post develop a credible argument
that freedom of speech is too broad a notion to supplant the concept
of academic freedom.
Freedom of speech allows anyone to say anything – even stupid
and wrongheaded things, even outrageous things – free from government censorship. Academic freedom, on the other hand, carries
11

COMMON GOOD at 34-35 (footnote omitted). Of course, I’ve always wondered
if – assuming that faculty members are “answerable to the public at large” – there
could be something akin to a shareholders’ derivative suit against faculty members whose research is scanty, fraudulent, or flat-out wrong.
12
My dad tells the story of a friend of his who wanted to research something that
the company wasn’t interested in having him research. Because that friend insisted on pursuing his own research goals, rather than the company’s research
goals, he was eventually laid off. The ability to pursue one’s own goals, rather
than one’s employer’s goals, is the hallmark of academia.
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constraints borne from the strictures of professional disciplines.
This point is important: too many academics assume that academic
freedom provides them the right to say anything, at any time, or to
do anything, at any time. Far from it:
Academic freedom, therefore, does not protect the autonomy of professors to pursue their own individual work free
from all university restraints. Instead academic freedom establishes the liberty necessary to advance knowledge, which
is the liberty to practice the scholarly profession. This point
is fundamental. Although the First Amendment may prohibit the state from penalizing the New York Times for misunderstanding the distinction between astronomy and astrology, no astronomy professor can insulate himself or
herself from the adverse consequences of such a conflation.
If the First Amendment protects the interests of individual
persons to speak as they wish, academic freedom protects
the interests of society in having a professoriate that can accomplish its mission. The Declaration advances a theory of
academic freedom that invokes “not the absolute freedom
of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching,
of the academic profession.13

Oh, do I wish I had been armed with this understanding of academic freedom when a professor once told me that no dean could
ever tell him what to do. He was correct in terms of understanding
13

Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). The 1940 Statement of Principles is equally clear. The
first point under the heading “Academic Freedom” states that “[t]eachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the
adequate performance of their other academic duties.” 1940 Statement of Principles,
supra n. 4. The second point, under the same heading, provides a limit on what
professors can teach: “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject.” Id. (emphasis added). Unlike freedom of speech, then, academic freedom is a relational freedom: faculty
members are free to explore and to teach that in which they have particular expertise, but their freedom has limits that relate to their expertise and to the public trust that they enjoy as faculty members.
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that no dean could choose his body of research for him14 or dictate
how he taught his courses; but he was woefully misinformed when
he argued that deans couldn’t tell him to do anything at all. Academic freedom has never protected the dereliction of duty. It is a
tradeoff: the freedom to inquire and to explain as a tradeoff for the
privilege of being engaged in the academy as a professional
scholar.15
For the Common Good takes us through the history of the development of academic freedom to the understanding of the principles
of freedom of research and freedom of teaching, while illustrating
the necessity of academic freedom with some key examples.16 The
14

I took this component of academic freedom to heart when, during my sabbatical
year after stepping down as dean, the Provost wanted the interim dean to dictate
what my research agenda should be. Had the Provost really tried to push the
issue, I would have relied on the 1940 Statement of Principles (and the wonderful
lawyer who represented me at the time) to fight back.

15

The tradition of academic freedom, with its twin commitments to freedom of research and to compliance with professional norms, nicely balances these negative and
affirmative dimensions. This balance would be lost if academic freedom were reformulated as an individual right that insulates scholars from professional regulation. Reformulated in this way, academic freedom would regard the communication of each
scholar as equally protected and thus enforce the premise, explicit within First
Amendment doctrine, that there is an “equality of status in the field of ideas.” It is
clear that this premise is inconsistent with the advancement of knowledge, which requires precisely that ideas be treated unequally, that they be assessed and weighed, accepted and rejected. The kind of individual freedom that underlies the structure of
First Amendment rights is for this reason ill-suited to the production of knowledge. It
instead expresses the postulate of equal, intrinsic, individual dignity that lies at the
foundation of legitimacy in a democratic state.

16

COMMON GOOD, supra n. 6, at 43 (footnotes omitted).
One of my favorite passages in the book details the claims of “hostile educational
environment” that various pundits have lobbed at higher education:
The idea of a “hostile environment” derives from anti-discrimination law. Employers
violate the civil rights of employees if they permit the workplace to become a hostile
environment for women or minorities. Critics of higher education wish to appropriate
this idea and apply it to the context of university teaching. As with the ideal of “balance,” there is a sense in which the idea is appropriately deployed. Professional ethics
require faculty to “demonstrate respect for students” and to avoid “any exploitation,
harassment, or discriminatory treatment.” Freedom of teaching would thus not protect a professor from disciplinary action if he were to harass, ridicule, or discriminate
against students for their political or religious beliefs.
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strength of this book – and it is a superb book – lies in the cogency
of its arguments and the lyricism of its prose. What’s not to love,
for example, about a passage that explains how tricky it is to distinguish an expansion of knowledge that differs from accepted canons
of belief from the quackery of a sham scholar?
The difficulty is that independence of thought and utterance
cannot be so easily cabined. Critical inquiry can turn on the
very framework of “accepted intellectual standards” that is
supposed to distinguish true knowledge from false belief.
An individual scholar can always claim that he or she is developing new and different intellectual standards, and this
claim can be justified on the incontestable ground that such
standards are themselves forms of knowledge that must be
open to critique and development. We are thus led to a
paradox. Intellectual standards are required to connect the
exercise of academic freedom to the production of knowledge, yet intellectual standards are also themselves forms of
knowledge whose evaluation requires academic freedom.
Academic freedom thus appears to be dependent on, yet
independent of, intellectual standards.
This paradox lies coiled at the core of the traditional
justification for freedom of research and publication.17

It is important, however, to distinguish between respect for persons and respect for
ideas. Faculty must respect students as persons, but they needn’t respect ideas, even
ideas held by students. In higher education no idea is immune from potentially scathing criticism. If a student identifies with his own ideas, he might well experience ruthless critique of those ideas as a personal assault. But it is precisely the pedagogical purpose of higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their own
ideas.

Id. at 105 (footnote omitted). We’ve developed a generation of emotionally fragile students who not only are uncomfortable with professors who challenge their
deeply held ideas but who also cannot seem to understand that universities are
not supposed to invite to campus only those speakers with whom the students
agree. Academic freedom protects faculty members who challenge students’
ideas (as well as the ideas of their own colleagues), so that teachers can eventually
demonstrate that the best response to a poorly developed thought isn’t censorship
or avoidance; it’s debunking the idea through analysis and debate.
17
Id. at 54.
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And with that paradox lies the rub:18 when academic freedom
intersects with the governance of a university, how do we distinguish those arenas that should clearly be within the prerogative of
the faculty from those arenas in which the expertise of the faculty
adds little, if anything, to the debate? I speak, of course, of the issue
of shared governance.19
Academic freedom addresses the parameters within which a professional scholar may use his or her training to pursue “the free
search for truth and its free exposition.”20 The reason that, as a part
of university governance, academic departments – and not “the administration” – should set and enforce their own standards regarding hiring, promotion, and tenure, and to set their own curricula
and admissions standards, is that the academic departments are in
the best position to know quality from mediocrity (or worse). Administrators who do not come from an academic discipline just
don’t have the bona fides to be entrusted with the ability to tell
wheat from chaff.
The problem, however, is that not all academic departments can
be entrusted to tell wheat from chaff, either. I’ve seen two different
problems with giving academic departments jurisdiction over even
those activities particularly within their purview. First, because the
establishment of high academic standards only works when a department pursues those standards, academic departments that are
less than purely motivated can engage in a race to the bottom.
(Think of those departments that refrain from hiring candidates
with “better” resumes than those of the current faculty, because the
department doesn’t want to “show up” its current members.) Laziness or insecurity can easily pervade a dysfunctional department,
and dysfunctional departments will tolerate shoddy research, poor
teaching, and a complete failure to perform the basic professorial
18

Cf. William Shakespeare, HAMLET, Act III, Scene 1, available at www.onlineliterature.com/shakespeare/hamlet/9/.
19
For a nice discussion of shared governance, see Gary A. Olson, Exactly What Is
‘Shared Governance’?, CHRON. HIGHER ED., July 23, 2009, available at chronicle.com/article/Exactly-What-Is-Shared-Gov/47065/.
20
1940 Statement of Principles, supra n. 4.
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functions. Post-tenure review policies in dysfunctional departments
are completely toothless, as long as they depend on the department’s faculty to enforce any standards.21 The faculty that shucks
responsibility together will decline together. I’ve seen it happen.22
The second failure of shared governance occurs because there is
no clear line of demarcation between purely academic areas and
those issues of governance more commonly left to the administration – e.g., budget issues, issues of allocation of space or other resources, and issues of compliance with the myriad regulations that
every university faces. The lines of authority not only blur but become tangled, sometimes irretrievably.
I’ve had the benefit of seeing these blurred lines at four different
institutions: as a faculty member at all four and as an administrator
at three out of those four. For example, when Tropical Storm Allison wiped out a significant portion of the University of Houston
Law Center in the summer of 2001, most of the professors were
away from Houston. The school somehow had to figure out how to
function during those summer months and during the renovation
and repair of the facilities afterwards. Thanks to some dedicated
staffers, we had email up and running even though we had only limited access to our buildings, no electricity or phone service, and
significant damage caused by fourteen feet of water coursing
through our facilities. That email functionality let the administration
run some “faculty decisions” by the faculty: for example, should we
require laptops, given that our library had been wiped out? But the
issue of whether the faculty or the administration had jurisdiction
21

And don’t get me started on detenurization. One almost has to be willing to kill a
trustee to face detenurization.
22
I’ve been at one institution that prevented the dean from putting a professor into
a post-tenure review rehabilitative program, even when that professor taught
poorly, hadn’t published in years, and performed very little service. Post-tenure
review at that institution required a faculty vote, and that faculty refused to vote
to put any of its members into a rehabilitative program, on the “there but for the
grace of God go I” theory. No professor was willing to pull the trigger on nonfeasance, so the end result of the faculty’s refusal was that the most productive
members of the faculty bore a disproportionate share of the school’s work.
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over particular decisions bogged down other pressing issues. What
should we do about redesigning a building that had lost one-and-ahalf usable floors?23 How could we teach law students without a
functioning library?24 What if we couldn’t rehab the facilities before
classes resumed in the fall?25 How could we run a functioning school
during the summer without any functioning buildings?26
Faculty decision-making tends to move at glacial speed for precisely the reason that people become professors: the need to consider all aspects of a question before deciding what to do about it.
My favorite provost27 used to remind deans that what made faculty
members so good – the ability to focus on an issue and see all sides
of a question – could occasionally make them very frustrating when
decisions had to be made posthaste. Moreover, faculty members are
extremely smart people, as a rule. They assume that they know, or
can learn, all about an issue so as to be able to talk intelligently
about it. The corollary to that assumption is that, because faculty
members are quick studies, they believe that they can opine intelligently, say, about budgets and facilities and other decisions that traditionally fall within the jurisdiction of administrators.
23

Answer: we formed a committee composed of faculty and administration to
redesign the space.
24
Answer: because we’d already installed a wireless system before Tropical Storm
Allison, we were able to give students access to research tools electronically –
hence, the laptop requirement.
25
Answer: we worried about this issue every single day between the end of the
storm and the beginning of classes. Every single day. Thanks, however, to the
generosity of our community and the willingness of our summer-school faculty to
teach off campus, we taught summer school in law firm conference rooms and
professors’ homes, missing only one week of classes because of the storm.
26
Answer: the university moved our “offices” to the basketball arena. Our accounting and other functions were in the luxury boxes, which weren’t particularly
luxurious. Our career services office was based in a concession stand. (The aftermath of the disruption of Career Services was the largest cause of the school’s
U.S. News ranking dip a few years later. One lesson that I learned is that Career
Services is one of the top three functions that a dean should preserve during a
crisis, right behind payroll and communications.)
27
My favorite provost worked at the University of Nebraska.
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Perhaps it’s true that those blurred lines of shared governance
would benefit from more faculty input. Nothing prevents an English
professor or an economist or a nuclear physicist from learning about
a university’s budget or deferred maintenance schedule and then
providing the administration with wise counsel about holes in the
budget or where best to spend building repair funds. But the problem with most blurred areas of shared governance is that the faculty
often wants to provide input without knowing all of the facts – an
activity that no professor should tolerate in his or her own research
area but which often occurs in, say, departmental or faculty senate
discussions. There’s just no SparkNotes version of budgets and space
allocation decisions for faculty members to use. There’s no good
way to study these types of issues superficially and be able to understand how all of the moving parts work together; and yet I’ve seen
too many professors insist on giving the type of input that bears no
relationship to administrative reality – and then insist that the administrators follow that input to the letter.
Moreover, once professors venture beyond their legitimate areas
of responsibility – beyond furthering their discipline’s research,
teaching their students, admitting new students, and hiring new
faculty members – the real problem of shared governance is the lack
of shared consequences for actions. If a faculty sets a budget and
then overspends it, the faculty members don’t get fired; but the
administrators might. If a faculty allocates portions of a building to
particular activities and the allocation doesn’t “work” for all of the
department’s constituencies, the faculty doesn’t get called on the
carpet;28 the department chair or dean does. If a faculty votes to cut
the size of the entering class or eliminate a program beloved by the
alumni, the faculty suffers no consequences (at least not directly),29
but the department chair or dean certainly does.
Ultimately, the problem with shared governance is that a good
working model of governance includes both clear hierarchies and

28
29

No pun intended. Really.
Eventually, of course, the budget or donations may suffer.
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consequences for irresponsible actions.30 Shared governance in universities has neither. The administrators in universities have a clear
hierarchy that (mostly) fits consequences to decisions (eventually).
But the hierarchy of faculty is fairly flat. Deans and chairs are “first
among equals,” with very little power to force professors to do
their bidding. There’s really not much that an administrator can do
to a tenured faculty member who isn’t pulling his weight, even in
these financially difficult times.
Really, the whole point of academic freedom is that it should be
tied to the responsibility of serving a good that’s larger than the individual professor’s needs. Academic freedom, especially as Finkin
and Post explain it, is inexorably linked to the highest goals of the
academy: it’s freedom of inquiry, not freedom from professional
standards or job duties. Academic freedom is like any great power:
with it comes great responsibility.31 Humility can’t hurt, either.

30

Want to see evidence of why consequences for irresponsible actions are important? Check out the bailout. See, e.g., David Stout, The Wall Street Bailout Plan,
Explained, NEW YORK TIMES, September 20, 2009, available at www.nytimes.
com/2008/09/21/business/21qanda.html.
31
SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002) (www.imdb.com/title/tt0145487/
quotes).
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